Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed to problematic meta-theoretical assumptions? A critical engagement with the politics of method by Weber, Heloise
Introduction
I would like to preface my contribution to this global conversation
with an acknowledgement. I very much appreciate the debate
initiated by Benjamin Cohen, not only for his persistence in trying to
instigate a wider exchange on why IPE today is boring, but also for
his call for an inclusive conversation about this and its implications. I
am also very grateful to Anna Leander for organising this forum in
such a way as to precisely facilitate a more global conversation about
the important concerns raised by Cohen’s intervention–global not
merely in the sense that the contributors hail from different parts of
the world, but also in the sense of bringing a much wider range of
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approaches and outlooks into the debate than in its previous
iterations. I recognise contributors to this forum as engaged (even if
in different strokes) in creative and intellectually rich debates that are
either explicitly relevant to questions of IPE, or fall directly under the
umbrella of IPE, as well as IR more generally. The questions and
puzzles that are animating my own research concerns – many of
which I would associate with concerns of ‘IPE’, although I prefer to
call it global political economy (GPE) – have benefited from the
influences of scholars participating in this forum. I feel the need to be
explicit about this for the following reasons:
I, too, have over the past years felt somewhat disheartened by the
dominance of certain perspectives and methods of analysis in our
dominant IPE-related journals. Now conceived as the mainstream IPE
journals, these rank as our discipline’s ‘top’ journals; yet they have
come to be not only ‘boring’ in the sense conveyed by Cohen, but
without a doubt are also decidedlynotwhere the big ‘meta-theoretical’
questions are put on the table (even if not always totally refined or
settled, these have occurred elsewhere).Thus I was somewhat
astounded that the (original) ‘debate about IPE’, picking up on
Cohen’s challenge in a special issue of RIPE, consisted of
(primarily) contributors I would associate with the mainstream.
Glaring omissions in that forum were critical voices working in
IPE/GPE, and the global politics of development and historical
political sociology – many of whom have been doing the work that
was called for. They were absent both as participants, and in terms of
having their works engaged in that context.2 It is also less than clear,
for instance, why important issues in IPE/GPE and global
development–such as race and racism, and colonialism and its
legacies – were completely absent. Equally striking was that there
was no engagement with gender theorists working in political
economy. For example, in Bananas, beaches and bases (1989),
Cynthia Enloe demonstrated how power relations play out at the
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intersection of ‘politics and economics’. Philip McMichael,
Balakrishan Rajagopal, Sydney Mintz, Roxanne Lyn Doty, David
Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, Siba N Grovogui, Robbie Shilliam,
Caroline Thomas, Anthony McGrew and Julian Saurin (among
others) have offered historically informed analyses of contemporary
challenges in the organisation of IPE/GPE, in some cases drawing
out the links between industrialisation, enslavement, and the
‘civilizing mission’. The link between Empire, early instantiations of
‘companies’ and corporations, and social and political formations
has been well established by postcolonial theorists and critical
human rights scholars (see, for example, Chakrabarty 2000; Baxi
1998). What are assumed to be settled and constitutive political
categories in mainstream approaches are virtually everywhere
contested, for instance, by indigenous movements struggling for
their rights and recognition against displacement due to attempts to
‘improve’ their lands as part of an ongoing ‘civilising process’ (see,
for instance, Shaw 2002). The IPE section of the International
Studies Association recently celebrated the work of Mike Davis (as
an ‘activist’ scholar) not least for his work on unravelling the global
political economic organisation of ourPlanet of Slums (2006). None
of this work seems to have made any impression on most of the
contributors to the debate in RIPE. In short, I was genuinely taken
aback that this ‘debate about a debate’ remained so ‘stuck’, sterile,
and abstracted from the lived lives and experiences of so many
people subjected to practices extended through the IPE/GPE and the
politics of global development.
I was equally struck by the lack of analytical rigour and critical
reflection in some of the contributions to the ‘debate about the
debate’. A case in point is Farrell’s and Finnemore’s mapping of IPE
in terms of two broadly competing (ontological) perspectives, which
they refer to as ‘rationalist (liberal)’ and ‘constructivist’.3 I found
myself asking whether constructivists could not also be committed to
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the premises of liberal political economy in their normative or
ideological disposition. Those constructivists working on the basis
of a broad acceptance of the main contemporary institutional
arrangements concerning trade and development, for example, will
very likely subscribe to familiar liberal premises of development and
progress. These premises include a commitment, implicit or explicit,
to the formal comparative method, and its underlying conception of
development and progress as tied to discrete units (i.e. states) in an
inter-state system (for critical perspectives, see Mitchell 2002;
McMichael 1990; Weber 2007). Such a commitment to the formal
comparative method is itself premised on normative precepts closely
associated with liberal conceptions of development and progress,
especially in the contemporary context. I consider the implications of
this in greater detail in part three.
In taking the call for a global conversation about the state of IPE
seriously, the elephant in the room cannot be ignored. This means
that, contra David Lake,4 the big questions continue to be as
important as they have always been, because, as I will show below,
accepting some underlying meta-theoretical premises as ‘given’ and
‘natural’ has too much at stake morally, intellectually and politically.
I am thinking here in particular of rising global inequalities and the
vulnerabilities these engender, as well as the big questions around
issues of ecological sustainability in the context of high-level
commitments to the pursuit of economic growth, which continues
unreformed to be the core measure of development. In raising these
concerns, I do not take the position (as recently argued) that the crux
of the matter of global inequalities could be resolved through a
critical focus on capital–labour relations.5 Instead, I develop my
contribution more in line with the critical perspectives outlined
above, and more resonant with John Hobson’s interventions later on
in the debate about IPE. I proceed along the following lines:
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In part one, I reconstruct central points of Benjamin Cohen’s
mapping of IPE in his call for more intellectually challenging and
stimulating approaches. As part of this examination, I identify some
contentious aspects of his approach, and unpack these in the context
of a critical examination. In part two, I aim to historicise IPE (contra
the mainstream version), following on also from other critical
contributions to this debate (including Hobson’s). In part three, I
return to the bigger question of the politics of method, focusing
critically on the practice of conflating methods with ideological
commitments, and to some extent on the question of the
contradictions of liberalism. In the conclusion, I argue for a much
more inclusive conception of political relations, one that gives an
account of social relations in political terms, and overcomes the
artificial distinction between politics and economics. This also
means moving beyond reductionist conceptions of development
associated with narrowly framed of approaches to (international)
political economy.
Part one
Benjamin Cohen’s mapping of
IPE: critical reconstruction
Cohen’s central argument is that the study of IPE is bifurcated, with
two broad approaches committed to distinctively different theoretical
and methodological premises located on either side of the Atlantic. By
briefly reconstructing his argument, my aim is to demonstrate why his
rendition of this problem is in itself contentious, engendering in turn
further potential misunderstandings and misapprehensions. This
critical discussion then provides the backdrop to an alternative account
of historicising IPE, which I trace in part two.
In his mapping of IPE, Cohen (2007) states that IPE as a ‘distinctive
academic field [ ... ] was born no more than a few decades ago’ (in
Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed to
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other words, in the 1970s). Taking as his point of departure Gilpin’s
definition of IPE as ‘the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in
international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of
power’ (2007: 197), he goes on to state the following (which is worth
quoting in full):
[ … ] IPE is about the complex linkages between
economic and political activity at the level of
international affairs. As a practical matter, such
linkages have always existed. As a distinct
academic field, however, IPE was born no more
than a few decades ago. Prior to the 1970s,in the
English-speaking world, economics and
political science were treated as entirely
different disciplines, each with its own view of
international affairs. Relatively few efforts were
made to bridge the gap between the two.
Exceptions could be found, often quite creative,
but mostly among Marxists or others outside
the ‘respectable’ mainstream of Western
scholarship.A broad-based movement to build
bridges between the separate specialities of
international economics and international
relations (IR) in effect, to construct the field we
know as IPE – was really of very recent origin
(2007: 197, my emphasis).
On the back of this assertion, Cohen proceeds to distinguish between
what he identifies as the American School and the British School of
IPE. According to Cohen, in the former, ‘priority is given to the
scientific method.’ In quoting Krasner –who is presented as ‘one of
the American School’s leading lights’ – Cohen aims to explicate
what differentiates the two schools. For Krasner, IPE ‘is deeply
embedded in the standard methodology of the social sciences which,
stripped to its bare bones, simply means stating a proposition and
testing it against external evidence’ (2007: 198). In contrast, the
British (‘and elsewhere in the English speaking world’) are more
receptive to drawing from other disciplines, ‘beyond mainstream
Heloise Weber
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economics and political science; they also evince a deeper interest in
normative issues. In the British style, IPE is less wedded to scientific
method and more ambitious in its agenda’ (2007: 198).
Cohen goes on to supplement his account of the differences between
the two schools ‘in terms of their contrasting understandings about
ontology and epistemology’(2007: 199). As Cohen states, in terms of
ontology, ‘the American school remains determinedly state-centric,
privileging sovereign governments above all other units of interest.
The British School by contrast, treats the state as just one agent
among many, if states are to be included at all’ (2007: 197). For the
American School, the ‘core object of study [ ... ] is limited to state
behaviour and system governance. The main purpose of theory is
explanation: to identify causality’ (my emphasis). This rendition of
‘the American School’ is problematic not least in the way in which
‘causality’ is associated exclusively with a very narrow set of
‘ontological’ and ‘methodological’ precepts. For instance, in both
historical and contemporary contexts, globally constituted unequal
relations have shaped differentially the very institutions (including
‘states’) which the ‘American School’ on Cohen’s account takes as
its point of departure for analysis; the formal/causal story here
simply abstracts from formative/relational underpinnings. I expand
on this point below, drawing in particular on critical work on the
limits of the formal comparative method.
Cohen moves on to characterise the second broad approach. For the
British School, he claims, IPE is
... more inclusive–more open to links to other
areas of inquiry. The problematique is more
ecumenical, concerned with all manner of
social and ethical issues. The main purpose of
theory is judgement: to identify injustice. The
driving ambition is amelioration: to make the
world a better place. Where the American
school aspires to the object ivi ty of
Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed to
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conventional social science, the British school
is openly normative in the tradition of
pragmatism and classic moral philosophy
(2007: 199-200, my emphasis).
In terms of epistemology,
the American school is wedded to principles of
positivism and empiricism- the twin pillars of a
hard science model. Deductive logic and
parsimonious reasoning are used to seek out
universal truths. Formal research
methodologies are put to work to test
hypotheses and promote cumulat ive
knowledge. The British School, by contrast,
embraces approaches that are more
institutional and historical in nature and more
interpret ive in tone. Less formal
methodologies are preferred in order to
accommodate the school’s wide range of
analytical concerns (2007: 200).
With these differences stated, and refracted through the lens of his
acceptance of Gilpin’s definition of the field, Cohen proceeds to map
the context of the historical origins of IPE as he sees it. The account
he gives of IPE’s origins as a disciplinary concern in the 1970s has
already been subjected to critical scrutiny as part of the debate about
his framing of IPE (Hobson 2013a, 2013b). My purpose here is to add
to these critical engagements by deepening the debate with reference
to methodological issues that have been sidelined thus far, including
those that touch on questions of ontology and epistemology.
In mapping the differences within IPE, Cohen does capture some
tendencies that differentiate approaches to studying the field as he
defines it in this context. However, what is more important here is
how these differences are ultimately framed and presented.
Understanding IPE to be fundamentally about ‘the reciprocal and
dynamic interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth
Heloise Weber
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and the pursuit of power’ (à la Gilpin) raises inadvertently (and one
may add necessarily) a concern with differential power relations, and
struggles over the unequal distribution of material resources.
Therefore, accepting the implications of Gilpin’s definition means
that IPE as a field is premised on highly normative precepts. The
concept of power itself is relational, and therefore implicates actors
with one another in ways necessarily inflected to normative concerns
(hence the need for justifications of power). In addition, the pursuit
of wealth is already imbued with ideas of ‘progress’ and
‘development’, both embedded again in highly normative accounts
of what constitutes ‘progress’ or ‘development’.
Consequently, if, as Cohen puts it, IPE is ‘about the complex
linkages between economic and political activity at the level of
international affairs’, and is about questions of power and wealth,
then the corollary is surely about relations of domination and
resistance and inequalities (which in turn could be explicitly engaged
in terms of question of injustices). If we accept that the study of IPE is
about relations of power and wealth, then we cannot sever the link to
its normative undercarriage.6 To distinguish the British School as
more committed to ‘making the world a better place’ (which it may
be too!) is besides the point, once we have already admitted that the
study of IPE is about questions pertaining to relations of power and
wealth as outlined above. The study of IPE simply cannot then be
conceived as value-free or objective, unless we want to defend
conceptions of social and political relations as somehow functioning
according to some laws of nature, and therefore not socially and
politically constructed. Such debates have already been had in global
development revolving around the core question of whether social
change is evolutionary or revolutionary, and I do not wish to rehash
them again (although the critical discussion below on method speaks
to this point).
Having established that normative questions inadvertently underline
any school of IPE (if we take Gilpin’s definition given above), the
Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed to
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question arises as to how these are to be handled theoretically and
methodologically. For the most part, the ‘scientific method’ as
posited by Cohen will not deliver on questions of the political
dynamics of unequal social relations and questions of power and
resistance, or will do so only if embedded and circumscribed in
theoretical and methodological contexts explicitly geared to disclose
these. If the scientific method means ‘stating a proposition and
testing it against external evidence’ (my emphasis), we will not get
very far in explaining causality (the ostensible aim of the American
School, according to Cohen). One problem here is how the
distinction between a proposition and ‘that which is external to it’ is
construed in the first instance (I explicate this in more detail by
drawing on a case example from World Bank research below).
Furthermore, in explaining causality, surely one may also be under
pressure to explicate reasons for unequal power relations and
disparities in material wealth, which cannot but distance such
reasoning from normative questions. While it is certainly possible to
decide not to make this part of a research agenda, this has the effect of
absenting an account of substantive social and political relations,
which have been historically central to large-scale political
transformations. Again, Cohen’s distinction in terms of the
problematique that sets the two schools apart does not really hold.To
state that the British school is not also about explaining causality but
rather intent on establishing judgement is consequently equally
misplaced, analytically and conceptually.7
Let me illustrate the broader points with a couple of examples that are
quite integral to IPE.8 Let’s take the following proposition by
drawing on an example used by the World Bank: one of its recent
studies (2011) draws a correlation (aiming at establishing a causal
connection in the sense implied by Cohen) between food riots and
poor governance (at the level of the state). The method adopted
draws a link between the number of food riots occurring within
selected states, and scores on the governance capacity of respective
Heloise Weber
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states (of course, the definition of weak governance is not always
explicated further; it nevertheless forms the normative backdrop).
Based on this proposition, one can declare then that food riots occur
in contexts of poor governance (as noted, without even necessarily
identifying the latter clearly). In so doing, what has been severed is
the link between food availability and a lack of entitlement to food by
those with no entitlement exchange (or lack of purchasing power),
and without access to redistributive mechanisms. Instead, the focus
shifts simply to ‘violence’(food riots) and poor governance,
abstracting precisely from any in-depth account of the political
economy of ‘hunger in the midst of plenty’(Sahlins1974: 36).To be
clear, the corresponding conception of ‘good governance’ is not to
prescribe the redistribution of food (or welfare more generally), but
rather, as noted, to deflect away from the causality of deprivation,
focusing instead on prescriptions, for example, regarding the
intensification of food production. How this example of hunger is
approached by mainstream accounts, of which the World Bank’s
stance above is typical, has deeper historical roots: it is of course akin
to the Malthusian fallacy, whereby, as Amartya Sen has argued, a
question of political science has been reduced analytically (and very
problematically!) to two physical magnitudes, namely food
availability and population (1983: 92). In this example from the
World Bank, the question of entitlement failure, as Sen has put it,
does not even come into the equation as a causal link (only perhaps as
a set of further, ‘exogenous variables’, under the header of the
violation of ‘peace and order’). This and similar approaches to
constructing and framing a problem both in research and practice is
really reflective of carefully crafted methods in ways that sever links
to causality,9 and delink deprivation from the ‘market episteme’.10
Such ‘politics of method’ continue to hold sway as ostensibly
value-free, objective knowledge about hunger specifically, and also
continue to inform debates about welfare provision, including in the
United States.11
Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed to
problematic meta-theoretical assumptions?...
923
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
Another, somewhat different issue I wish to draw on in order to
demonstrate the ‘politics of method’ implied in reducing IPE to
analytics in terms of inter-state relations is the historical case of the
call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s.
Cohen also refers to this (2007:201), as an example of an effort to
‘fundamentally transform the rules governing relations between the
wealthy “North” and the poverty-stricken “South’” (2007: 201).That
the call for an NIEO did go up at the United Nations is a historical
fact. But beneath this fact, the categorisation of the ‘poverty-stricken
“South”’ is not a fact to be understood in terms of a pre-given,
originary condition. If we were to start from the proposition that it is
(as per the American School), we would take states as our formal
units of analysis, conceived as discrete for analytical purposes, and
proceed to map and compare their respective stages of growth or
development (as per modernisation theoretic assumptions); in the
more explicit parlance of disciplinary IR, we would perhaps refer to
‘degrees of statehood’ in the same context. The causalities beneath
their respective experiences of poverty (or disparity in terms of
economic wealth) will then not be explained as an outcome of
historical relations and, for instance, legacies of colonialism,which
could explain the substantively unequal international political
economic structures of the post-1945 era (inherited in the aftermath
of struggles for decolonisation). Rather, applying the formal
(state-centred comparative method), one may simply take ‘their’
condition as ‘given’ and an expression of states on ‘lower rungs’ of
the development ladder (see, for example, Rostow 1960 and Sachs
2005); explanations of ‘their’ condition are then construed by
reference to the unit itself and its purely internal dynamics, and not as
an expression of unequally constituted global social relations.12
Against the backdrop of these two examples, I want to reinforce the
critical point that the ways in which we frame our research
propositions themselves are highly significant, and that this framing
is not a value-free exercise. The same would apply to identifying our
Heloise Weber
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markers for comparison; the question of whether we adopt an
immanent critique or aim to develop analysis through ‘external’
variables is not without social and political implications. The former
approach gives us a very different explanation of causality not tied to
determining ‘positions’ on ladders, even if normative positions
explicitly accompany the analysis. The latter takes the ‘ladder
metaphor’ (or related modernisation theoretic criteria) as its
unquestioned normative premise for an evaluation of states based on
the formal comparative method (McMichael 1990; Weber 2007).
This may not be surprising, given that, as Cohen notes, ‘the
American School remains determinedly state-centric, privileging
sovereign governments above all other units of interest’ (2007:199).
The issue here is not so much that the state remains the unit of interest
(of course it may legitimately be that too), but rather that it also stands
in as the unit of analysis for explaining the distributions of global
wealth and power.
The formally conceived analytical approach must be differentiated
from substantively constituted global social and political relations.
The fact, then, that states may be ‘units of interest’ in ideological
terms does not mean that state-centric analysis can necessarily
follow to frame all relevant analysis, with no acknowledgement of
the analytical and conceptual problems this sort of move entails. To
subscribe to state-centred analysis as a general premise is to conflate
methodwith ideological interests. Conflating a general commitment
to focusing centrally on the state with the notion that this delivers an
intrinsically more valid and objective method of analysis has the
effect of delegitimizing analyses that foreground relations reaching
beyond and through the inter-state architecture and may be more
central to understanding IPE.
Before I turn to a more explicit engagement with the ahistorical basis
of IPE in the American School, I would like to conclude this section
by restating that the distinction set up by Cohen between the two
schools of the Atlantic divide is problematic. What is at stake, really,
Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed to
problematic meta-theoretical assumptions?...
925
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
is whether we accept the American School’s premises as
intellectually and analytically more rigorous (because of its
ostensible adherence to ‘scientific method’). Furthermore, as I have
argued, to frame the two competing methods as motivated by
explanation and judgment respectively is highly problematic, not
least because of the ahistorical and judgemental bias (see above) of
the American School. The deeper history of social relations in the
organisation of global wealth and poverty, which has entailed
enslavement as well as racial and gender inequalities, is eviscerated
from mainstream IPE. At this point, the question needs to be posed of
why more historically based approaches could be categorised as
being outside the ‘respectable’ mainstream of IPE, as Cohen
construes them in the quotation above. What exactly gives
mainstream IPE more ‘respectability’ over other intellectually
rigorous accounts of the relationship between power and wealth?
Furthermore, if indeed IPE consolidated as a discipline in the 1970s
(as per the mainstream definition), it did so at a point in time when
critical challenges to international power relations were forcefully
placed at the level of international relations (such as the call by the
then ‘Third World’ for a NIEO). It appears that mainstream IPE
instead sought to distance itself (intentionally or not) from
explanations of causality in analysis of power and wealth, including
and especially by abstracting from historical relations of
development and retreating to formal political units of interest to
derive explanatory frameworks. It is to a more expansive discussion
of the historical relations of global development/IPE that I turn next.
Part two
Historicising IPE: why critical
historical analysis matters
The narrative of the origins of IPE as a sub-field of IR emerging in
the1970s is problematic on several counts. As part of this ‘debate
Heloise Weber
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about IPE’, John M Hobson (2013a, 2013b) has already provided a
compelling account of the historical relations that have constituted,
albeit unequally, global political economic relations. According to
such accounts, colonialism and the colonial division of labour (as
part of the legacy of colonialism) that ensued in the post-1945 era
(which subsequently came to be referred to as the international
division of labour) is a significant causal factor in the reproduction of
international and global disparities of wealth, power, and
insecurities. As noted above, the call for a NIEO by the then newly
independent states explicitly foregrounded the substantively
unequal relations of power and wealth that the formally independent
states inherited at the point of decolonisation, which was a
consequence of colonialism and its legacies. Properly speaking,
then, IPE, was already theorised through historical analysis by early
Latin American structuralists (such as Raul Prebish at the ECLA) as
well as those who came to be labelled as Dependistas – from Andre
Gundre Frankto Samir Amin to Walter Rodney, to name a few. The
making of unequal global political economic relations (and I
emphasise relations here, not least to capture forced movement,
displacement, and the dispossession of people to work on
plantations, for example) and its enduring legacies have been further
elaborated on by Eric Wolf, exposed in the longue durée history of
development of Fernand Braudel, and rendered in stark terms by
Mike Davis (just to give a couple of examples).
More specifically, the relationship between enslavement, the
industrial revolution, indentured labour, and the institutionalisation
of the plantation complex with all its brutality have also been
theorised by scholars such as CLR James, Sydney Mintz and Eric
Williams, for example. Others have also connected global and local
relations through plantation complexes in the organisation of global
capitalism. This history of ‘global development’ is also the history of
IPE, properly speaking (and, of course, the history of international
Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed to
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relations too). This colonial history of the global organisation of
wealth and power cannot be eviscerated by ahistorical methods of
analysis, wherein the formal is conflated with substantive social and
political economic relations. It is through the delinking of these
historical and transnational relations by means of state-centred
analysis (in this case, the method associated with the American
School) that framing categories such as the ‘poverty-stricken
“South”’, configured as if this were an originary condition, become
possible, and are rendered with whatever plausibility they may have
for their adherents.
Inclusive accounts of substantive global connections, including
historical and contemporary ones, were therefore already available
from a wealth of sophisticated analysis (including, but by no means
limited to, those identified above). We could add to this list the
work of brilliant historical sociologists/global political
economists/scholars of global development such as Philip
McMichael, Immanuel Wallerstein and Dale Tomich. Thus the
‘growing interdependence of national economies’ of the 1970s
(Cohen 2007:201) actually had a much deeper history that
established the unequal political economy connections at the heart of
the concerns of the NIEO. While Cohen is right to identify the 1970s
as reflective of further significant changes in the global political
economy, the period is not the point at which ‘interdependence
began to grow or intensify’. Rather, it did signal the beginning of the
end of an era in which core capitalist states maintained a political
commitment to ‘embedded liberalism’. To this end, John Ruggie’s
normative analysis associated with the concept of embedded
liberalism did, of course, capture the essence of government
intervention in the economy to ensure that welfare could be provided
for through redistribution in core capitalist states. However,
Ruggie’s framework failed to acknowledge the contingency of
embedded liberalism: it rested on the possibilities afforded by
Heloise Weber
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inherited structural inequalities, again, which were at the heart of
the NIEO debate. The big political debates and political economic
shifts of the 1970s were thus important: these political debates were
about historically constituted unequal relations, and yet the
mainstream IPE that emerged in this context could simply deflect
these concerns away through a recourse to state-centric formalism,
and attempts to reinforce the enduring power of the capitalist core
through hegemonic stability theory.13 The latter, too, emerged in a
context of crises; for example, in global politics, we saw the forging
of OPEC as a power bloc, partially in response to the Yom Kippur
War. The 1970s also marked the beginning of the rise of neoliberal
ideology, with political efforts aimed at picking away at the
welfare-state model (the ‘embedded liberal’ compromise) aspiring
to establish what Philip Cerny termed several decades ago the
‘competition state’. It is an era that experienced both the rise of Third
Worldism as a political project and the subsequent gradual shift by
state representatives towards an acceptance of neoliberal premises of
development. Of course, linked to the circulation of ‘petro-dollars’
are the subsequent debt crisis, and the conditionalities of the World
Bank and IMF, which resulted in the re-emergence of ‘food riots’ in
many states of the global South (see Walton and Seddon 1994).
Against this brief sketch of historical relations, then, it is more than a
little problematic to locate the origins of IPE in the 1970s. Even if
we were to focus away from the insights of dependency theorists,
early modernisation theorists were explicitly engaged in normative
evaluations of the ostensible ‘backwardness’ of ‘other’ societies, and
were politically engaged in planning their paths to progress and
prosperity based on a ‘stages of growth logic’ as early as the 1950s.
However, even if the specific global political context of the 1970s is
identified as significant for the emergence of the IPE Cohen renders
in his account, superstars of IPE are clearly selectively identified.
The criteria of selection include a commitment to formalism over
substantive analysis, reflected in ahistoricism as well as narrow
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conceptions of relations of power and wealth. To identify analysis
and approaches that ultimately explicitly align with liberalism in
terms of political ideology is to define the field of inquiry according
to ideological predispositions. But even if one has a commitment to
liberalism in terms of ideology, this should not be a licence to insist
on methods that are explicitly crafted to reflect and uphold such
ideological commitments, cast as ‘scientific method’.
The formalist fallacy, of course, has been the subject of critiques
advanced by feminists, critical political economists and critical
political theorists. In liberal political economy, formal equality in the
economic sphere explains away substantively unequal social
relations, because we are said to engage in contracts through free
choice. But free choice means little if structural conditions are
stacked in order to sustain the reproduction of fundamentally
unequal social relationships. Similarly, if ‘American IPE’ is said to
retain a commitment to state-centrism (and not just an interest in the
state), whereby the state is taken as the ‘analytical point of departure
and return’,14 substantive social and political relations that reach
beyond or through the boundaries are eviscerated, both in historical
and contemporary contexts. To eschew critical historical analysis
based on substantive relations in favour of formal analysis is to miss
the sources of social and political change. I will come back to this
point in my concluding section. Prior to that, however, I move on to
discuss further the question of method in relation to the ‘big
questions’ of global political economy.
Part three
Politics of method: why the big
questions matter
Let us set aside, for now, the normative question of why any
engagement with questions of international political economy ought
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to have something to say not just about the ‘pursuit of power and the
pursuit of wealth’, but should also adopt a dialectical approach and
say something about deprivation, struggle, resistance, and
inequality. Instead, it is instructive to return to the question of method
and engage the political implications of methodological choices. In
doing so, we should remind ourselves that the context of thinking and
writing about IPE is set comprehensively by issues of development;
in one way or another, all explorations in political economy speak to
questions of what development means, should comprise, and be
expected to change. To heed this basic concern is to open a window
on the politics of method, which discloses another important aspect
of the ‘poverty of IPE’ identified by Cohen.
To recap, as Cohen has stated in terms of ontology, ‘the American
School remains determinedly state-centric, privileging sovereign
governments above all other units of interest’ (2007: 1999). As noted
above, in terms of the American School’s approach, the privileging
of the state as its key unit of interest proceeds in tandem with the state
being the key unit of analysis. There is a difference here. The state
can be the key unit of interest without it also being adopted as the key
unit of analysis. When the latter is equated with the former,
ideological commitment is easily conflated with method. Of course,
Cohen does suggest that the state is the ‘key unit of interest’ (and not
analysis), but once we enquire into what co-ordinates make up the
method of analysis of the American School, it is clear that the
commitment to state-centrism travels well beyond interest in the
state and into method (as the key unit of analysis), or what is
subsequently presented as ‘scientific method’.15
But what price do we pay for an adherence to formalism and a
commitment to state-centric analysis? As already noted, we dispense
with substantive relations that are at the basis of social and political
relations and transformations. A consequence is therefore the actual
failure to have anything meaningful to say about the relations of
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domination and contestation at play in social and political
transformations. Philip McMichael already explicitly engaged with
the question of method in analysis of social and political
transformations in 1990. In explicitly problematising the state as the
unit of analysis, acknowledging the insights of world system
theorists, but without accepting a structuralist ontology, he argued
for an alternative non-state-centric conception of global change. As
McMichael noted, the adoption of the state as the unit of analysis is
also based on a comparative logic, explicitly in terms of ‘stages of
growth’ or stages of development. McMichael went on to show why
this comparative logic is ahistorical, and thus also fundamentally
flawed. Instead, he argued for the method of ‘incorporated
comparison’.
Rather than using ‘encompassing comparison’
– a strategy that presumes a ‘whole’ that
governs its ‘parts’ –it progressively constructs
a whole as a methodological procedure by
giving context to historical phenomena. In
effect, the ‘whole’ emerges via comparative
analysis of ‘parts’ as moments in a
self-forming whole. I call this incorporated
comparison. ‘Incorporated comparison’ stems
from the critique of ‘modernization theory,’
and includes the theoretical proposition that
international organization is continually
evolving. The goal is not to develop invariant
hypotheses via comparison of more or less
uniform ‘cases,’ but to give substance to a
historical process (a whole) through
comparison of its parts. The whole, therefore,
does not exist independent of its parts. Whether
considering nation-states or a singular world
system, neither whole nor parts are permanent
categories or units of analysis. Generalization
is historically contingent because the units of
comparison are historically specified (1990:
386).
Heloise Weber
932 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL – vol. 37, no 3, september/december 2015
Contexto Internacional (PUC)
Vol. 37 no 3 – set/dez 2015
1ª Revisão: 11/10/2015
2ª Revisão: 22/10/2015
As McMichael noted in the abstract to this article, which is worth
citing in full:
Recent critiques of modernization theory have
questioned the comparability of its central
organizing concept, the ‘national society.’ The
logic of comparative inquiry requires
independent or independent but uniform’
cases’ and formal quasi-experimental signs of
or comparative generalization. Global
conceptions of social change violate formal
comparative requirements, necessitating an
alternative form of ‘incorporated comparison,’
that takes both multiple diachronic and
singular synchronic forms. Incorporated
comparison is used to conceptualize variation
across time and space when time and space
dimensions are neither separate nor uniform.
The fixed units of analysis employed by
modernization and world-system theories
yield to an alternatives strategy of grounding
the analytical units of comparison in the
world-historical processes under
investigation. Recent studies illustrate this
alternative to formal comparison and
incorporated comparison into the process of
substantive inquiry (1990: 385).
Read through the lens of McMichael’s critical account of the
comparative method, the logic of analysis according to the American
School has propositions in place which abstract from substantive,
constitutive relations: ‘In the beginning’, there were the wealthy
states of the West, and the ‘poverty-stricken “South”’. The approach
favoured by proponents of the conventional perspective is to set
aside any interrogation or problematisation of their analytical
categories (such as the state and the market). At the same time, the
criteria of conventional accounts of development (which are linked
to the core premises of IPE) are used as core comparative markers.
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The central unit of comparison and analysis is the state, at least
according to the ‘American School’. There are exceptions, though.16
A critical global historical and relationally conceived analysis can
explicate how everyday relations of development have come to be
located within broader global ‘structures’ (institutions) of
governance. Of course, this would not necessarily mean that global
relations of inequalities would be revealed in the fullest possible
ways. But it would mean being able to provide a more
comprehensive account of global relations of inequalities,
deprivation and dispossession. It would provide for a distinctively
different rendition of how power is organised and sustained globally,
rather than merely being reduced to an account of inter-state
relations. The historically informed approach I have outlined above
can certainly account for states and state power; however, it does so
without adopting state-centrism as its ontological premise.
Why, then Do the ‘Big’
Questions Still Matter?
In a world in which global relations affect the lives of distant others,
where commodity chains (or ‘value chains’) comprise unequal
relations of development, while institutions of governance push for
hyper-forms of the ‘competition state’ to the detriment and denial of
fundamental entitlements to many globally, we must ask: who and
what is the subject of our enquiry, and what is our conception of
development? As social movements and practices of resistance to
inequalities continue to shape the early years of the 21st century, with
an immanent ecological crisis accompanied by new ‘land grabs’, and
the recent (re)endorsement of economic growth as the core measure
of development, we must ask the normative questions as political
theorists: through what meta-theoretical assumptions do we justify
continuing domination and deprivation?
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If the British School, explicitly acknowledging normative questions,
is more ambitious in its agenda, and is historical in its approach
(going beyond accounts limited by the formalism of state-centrism),
surely this ought to entail better prospects for political theory and
analysis? Does the British School explain causality better than the
American School, and make a normative case for why the pursuit of
wealth through domination may not just be politically but also
ethically problematic? As the political anthropologist James Scott
has argued convincingly, social and political relations of domination
are always contingent, precisely because any power relation is never
stable, but always processed and resisted. There is a whole rich
political life-world that a commitment to formalism cannot even
begin to imagine; yet, it is the life-blood of political transformations
(Scott 1990).
Conclusion
Towards a more inclusive account of politics, and a non-reductionist
conception of development (Going beyond the ‘economy’)
Given all this, the task for an IPE that is both less boring and more
relevant to the ways in which contemporary development trajectories
are experienced and processed by people requires first and foremost a
widening of our concept of politics. In 1988 already, R J B Walker
wrote in One World, Many Worlds that political life is an everyday
practice and not the privilege of politicians and institutions of
governance. In identifying social movements and actors in political
struggles, Walker’s objective was to explicate the practice of politics
as an everyday struggle. To take such insights seriously is to begin to
recognize the problems entailed, for instance, as a result of the
widespread and much enforced idea that development is somehow
coextensive with economic growth, measured in aggregate at the level
of the state. Because of its acceptance of unquestioned underlying
premises regarding the separation of politics from economics, as well
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as an implicit (if not explicit) acceptance of development and progress
as exclusively defined in terms of the ‘pursuit of wealth and power’,
conventional IPE systematically excludes a whole range of
alternative, more inclusive approaches to development and progress.
More than merely an intellectual shortcoming, this exclusion amounts
to a reductionist conception of development which is closely aligned
with predilections for framing social life as inherently grounded in
capitalist social relations. An IPE that sees the world through this lens
only may record the fact that market relations are being intensified,
and more and more goods and services privatised and rendered in the
required terms of ‘exclusionary property’ through the
commercialisation principle. It will not be able to situate these in
relation to the social struggles and conflicts they engender; instead of
interrogating political economy in depth, it naturalises a reductionist
version of it.
A completely different understanding of the workings of the ‘world
economy’ is advanced when the manifold practices of push-backs,
resistances and struggles (sometimes manifest, but always
immanent) are put centre stage, not least analytically. Movements
and struggles epistemically disclose a politics that is in play
dialectically, through which the categories of an overly
formalistically oriented IPE are unsettled. The challenges to the
ontological premises of a ‘boring IPE’ (as Cohen has put it) are, in
this way, clearly articulated by movements such as La Via
Campesina, transnational indigenous activism, or elements of green
political movements. Corresponding to such examples of movement
struggle, there are the ‘micro-level’ actions at the level of everyday
politics that analysts and critical scholars such as Walker,
McMichael or Scott (among others) have drawn attention to.
All of this pushes IPE beyond the confines of formalist accounts of
politics, which feminists have also long criticised, drawing on similar
insights (for example, see Enloe 2011; Elias 2013). The contours of
what Hobson has gestured at with his concept of inter-civilisational
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dialogue, and Cristina Rojas (2007) has proposed as ‘IPE otherwise’
in the register of ‘cultural political economy’, are cogent to such
concerns. In his critical engagement with the dominant human rights
discourse, Siba N Grovogui, drawing on the Haitian revolution, has
argued that much can be said for taking seriously emotions, affect and
resistance as underlying sources of social change for realising more
progressive relations, particularly in contexts where it is precisely
through discourses of ‘rationality’ that practices of domination and
deprivation have ensued for many (2011: 62).
In the liberal-capitalist world economy, the artificial distinction
between the public and private spheres plays out in terms of
juxtaposing politics and economics. However, the accounts of
selfhood (and selves) that emerge from this imaginary and are central
to it are demonstrably mere abstractions. This was identified already
by Karl Polanyi who pointed out the contingency of attempts to treat
as commodities that which is not, and cannot be in accordance with
its original condition. Importantly, then, through analysis premised
on relational perspectives, more comprehensive accounts of
‘causality’ can be rendered, explicating how everyday relations of
inequalities, ostensibly construed as natural, are anything but that.
Through such critical perspectives, their social construction can be
revealed, following Gramscian and neo-Gramscian accounts of
hegemony and social struggles, for example. Critical historical
analyses (relational) also open up the substantive contexts through
which the normative questions can be debated in normative terms.17
A relational (and dialectical) analysis pushes for enquiry to be
substantively grounded over theoretical abstraction, while a
commitment to relational analysis is also uniquely conducive to
keeping meta-theoretical questions and concerns in the forefront of
research.
Once again, I am grateful to Benjamin Cohen for initiating the debate
without which this critical conversation would perhaps not have
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taken place. Anna Leander’s commitment to organising this forum
as a global conversation has taken it to another level. My thanks!
Notes
1. I refer here to the title of an article by Cohen (2010):‘Are IPE journals
becoming boring?’
2. Ravenhill mentions the works of Caroline Thomas and Anthony McGrew,
among others, as representing a ‘missing middle’ (2008: 24). While this
recognition of their work is important, and thus welcome, I am not sure that
either would locate themselves in terms of a ‘missing middle’.
3. See Farrell and Finnemore (2009: 60).
4. For instance, in his contribution to the 2009 debate about IPE, Lake states:
‘I have relatively little patience for the Great Debates in IR and IPE. [ … ] I often
wish that scholars would stop contemplating how to do research and simply get
on with the business of explaining, understanding, and possibly improving the
world we inhabit and, in part, create’ (2009: 48). Katzenstein offers a
considered and critical engagement with Lake’s framing of the American
School of IPE in terms of the open economy politics (2009: 125-127).
5. See,for example, Selwyn (2014).
6. Higgott and Watson (2008: 10) make a similar point: ‘First, IPE is bound by
the exploration of the relationship between power and wealth. It cannot
therefore be modeled on modes of analysis appropriate to studying one in
isolation from the other …’
7. Higgott and Watson (2008) also critically discuss Cohen’s framing of the
debate about IPE itself. See especially pages 6-7.
8. My contribution to this forum focuses on the ‘bigger picture’ challenges
implied in Cohen’s call, and hence does not afford me with an opportunity to
develop detailed case examples. For those looking for applications of some of
the methodological and conceptual moves I sketch here in the context of
empirical cases, see for instance Weber (2002, 2004, 2006, 2014 and 2015).
9. I elaborate some of this in more detail in Weber (2015).
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10. I am drawing on McMichael’s argument about the epistemic privileging
of the ‘market calculus – where the market has become the dominant lens
through which development is viewed. An episteme is an approach to
knowledge about the world, based on a core set of assumptions that seem like
common sense. Thus the market and its ‘invisible hand’ assumptions
(neutrality, efficiency, rationality) have come to represent the central episteme
in the modern enterprise of development. Since these assumptions have
common-sense appeal, they normalise the market calculus in the discourse and
pursuit of development’ (2010: 3).
11. For a critical account, see, for example, Somers and Block (2005).
12. In many ways, this was the critique of Dependency Theory (DT) as a
counterpoint to modernisation theoretic accounts of development. This critical
point is expanded upon below.
13. See also Hobson for a similar point (2013: 1047).
14. See Saurin (1995: 245). He offers an excellent critical discussion of
state-centred analysis, exposing its high problematic implications.
15. Cohen’s persistence in defending the American School (2008) must be
called out for its ideological disposition rather than ‘scientific method’, even
though he insists that: ‘I am inclined to award points to the American School for
its closer adherence to the principles of positivism and empiricism – the twin
pillars of conventional social science. The formal research methodologies that
are so powerful in the United States allow for rigorous testing of hypotheses and
a systematic cumulation of knowledge, as compared with the more informal
approaches traditionally favoured by the British School scholars’ (2008: 32).
He continues: ‘[T]his is not to say that the British School lacks rigour ... but
formal empirical inquiry is simply not the British School’s strong suit’ (32). A
similar critique about Cohen’s framing of IPE is made by Higgott and Watson
who state that ‘the presentational device embedded in Cohen’s caricature serves
to naturalise a particular way of doing IPE so as to enforce exactly the sort of
limits on IPE scholarship that he uses his article to warn against (2008: 2). On
the contrary, one could argue that (upon close reading) Cohen does not really
warn against the American School, but rather aims precisely to shore up its
approach and delegitimise those critical historical approaches by framing them
as ‘informal’ and thereby less scientific and ultimately less rigorous.
16. See, for example, Germain’s contribution to the ‘debate about IPE’
(2009). He also cautions against the influence (and power) of the ‘Harvard
School’ and its followers (students). See also Katzenstein (2009).
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17. See also, for example, Katzenstein on the intellectual and political
significance of normative dimensions (2009: 132). He also makes the point
about the significance of listening to dissenting voices (2009: 133).
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Abstract
Is IPE just ‘boring’, or committed
to problematic meta-theoretical
assumptions? A critical
engagement with the politics of
method
In my contribution to this forum on IPE, my aim is to add further to the
critical interventions in the debate ignited by Benjamin Cohen. The call to
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discuss the state of IPE has been timely, though not only because (some)
IPE journals have indeed become uninteresting; much more is at stake.
Intellectual debate in the field has now not only narrowed, but has also
shifted away from engaging the underlying premises of (global)
development, inequalities, and relations of domination. As such, the
mainstream framing of IPE is arguably also implicated in a project of
‘gate-keeping’. This is not to say that the intellectual richness and creativity
that Cohen has called for in the study of IPE does not exist; such work is
pursued by scholars of IR, more broadly conceived, and not just by those in
other disciplines. Such richer scholarship has for instance, been advanced
by historical sociologists, postcolonial theorists, and critical scholars of
global development/global political economy including many working
from feminist political-economic perspectives. The absence of an
engagement with such perspectives in the mainstream of IPE can perhaps be
explained to some extent by reference to ideological dispositions and
attempts to maintain a hold on the disciplinary core along epistemological
and methodological premises committed to ostensibly power-free and
value-free analysis. The consequences are felt, as Cohen notes, also in the
context of training and preparing future generations of IPE scholars, where
current practices tend to reproduce students unable to ‘ask and respond to
the big questions’, and who have instead come to be satisfied with applying
‘accepted’ methods. Critical scholars, on the other hand, have continuously
pushed beyond the analytical and theoretical boundaries, engaging for
example, with questions of power, domination and resistance, and more
often than not such analyses are grounded in empirical research. In this
contribution, I aim to demonstrate, through a critical reconstructive sketch,
how mainstream IPE falls short, and what the value is of alternative,
relationally conceived, analytical approaches.
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